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INTRODUCTION
Some researchers focused on the classical institutional factors such as
democracy and how they affect economic success in former planned
economies. As such, Fidrmuc (2003) tested the validity of the findings
in the growth literature that democracy tends to harm growth at the
early stages of development. He revealed that a direct influence of
political liberalisation on growth was negative (i.e. in the early stages).
On the other hand, he also found that democracy had a positive
indirect impact on growth, which was realised through liberalisation
policies. However, this indirect impact was insignificant in the early
period of transition. He explains that in transition countries
democratisation was largely imposed by the international organisations
(e.g. as part of the EU accession terms), while some successful
economies such as South Korea implemented political reforms only
after their economic policies proved to be successful. On the contrary,
China still remains as the communist nation after its proven success
with the economic reforms. The author concludes that democratisation
as such is unable to explain growth differences in the transition process
and therefore an autocratic market economy is expected to be more
conducive to economic development in the former planned economies.
Furthermore, Cheung (1998) argues that initiatives to implement
democratic reforms in the post-communist countries tend to have
significant economic costs. He explains that the vertical rent
distribution system inherited from the former communist era cannot be
transformed into the horizontal one unless the transition to a private
property-based economy is complete. Otherwise, as he predicts, there is
a risk of ending up with the political and economic system similar to
India, where the officials tend to issue extra regulations to compensate
for the loss of their vertical gains. Other scholars proposed that the
“strong hand” policy is favorable to support the economy at times of
recession (see Roland, 2002).
The article aims to contribute to the debate by examining institutions,
which have been most important for growth in transition countries.
Like other articles in the institutional literature, we test growth
against institutions and classical growth factors such as investment
and export. However, our sample focuses on the post-1996 period of
the transition process, which allows avoiding the period of structural
breaks in the early 1990s. Also we employ a new set of the institutionalAzim Raimbaev  3
variables published by the World Bank (WB) against the transition
index of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), which has been commonly used by other researchers. The
transition index represents the quality of restructuring (e.g.
privatisation), while the governance indicators (e.g. rule of law)
measure the quality of institutions. We employ the governance data
from an aggregate and four individual sources
1. Since the institutional
variables tend to correlate strongly with the rest of regressors, we
thoroughly examine all sources in order to choose the variables that
are not subject to multicollinearity. We also test for the presence of
endogeneity between growth and institutions.
1 LITERATURE REVIEW
There is no unique set of institutional variables that is commonly
accepted by all researchers. As two of the most often-referenced
authors in the field Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer put it, the main
justification behind searching for other (a new set of) variables
explaining institutional change is that these new variables provide an
additional insight into the sources of economic growth. As an example,
Knack and Keefer (1995) tested the databases of the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk
Intelligence (BERI) as the alternatives to the Gastil indices offered by
Barro (1991). The ICRG includes measures of the expropriation risk,
rule of law, repudiation of contracts by the government, government
corruption and quality of bureaucracy, while the BERI database
represents the quality of the contract enforceability and infrastructure.
On the other hand, the Gastil indices, which were once the only
institutional data source, measure the civil liberties and political
freedom. To avoid the multicollinearity between these databases,
authors aggregated all indices of the ICRG and BERI into the single
ICRG and BERI variables, respectively.
Originally Barro (1996) employed the following growth equation
specification:
       ,  =   ,  +      60 ,  +      60 ,  +       60 , 
+           ,  +          ,  +           ,  +   , 
1 All of them are published by the World Bank at
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where        ,  is the annual growth of real output from 1690 to 1985
of the country   at time  ,    60 is initial income in the sample of
1960-85,    60 and     60 are secondary and primary school
enrollment in 1960,         is government consumption,    is
the Gastil democracy indices and 	
 is the deviation of the
Summers and Heston investment deflator from the sample mean. This
was later modified by Knack and Keefer (1995) in order to substitute
the ICRG and BERi for the Gastil indices. The results indicated that
the ICRG and BERI coefficients had a better explanatory power than
did the Gastil measures. Moreover, they were robust to the inclusion of
investment variables, which implies that even if the returns were
expected to be high in the countries with low capital stock, investors
would prefer to invest into the high stock countries with high quality
institutions. Another important finding is that the capital
accumulation and similar classical explanatory variables were not
included into the regression based on the assumptions that they would
be correlated with the variables such as government consumption and
property rights protection (i.e. capturing their influence and producing
biased standard errors). The authors admit that the specification used
by them, as well as, by Barro(1996) is subject to omitted variable bias.
However, they argue that growth depends on multiple factors and it is
normal for any equation to omit some of them (Knack and Keefer
1995). The ICRG and BERI proved to be significant also in the case
when the Gastil indices were included into the regression. According to
the authors, this result suggested that the former captured the effect of
some variables omitted by Barro and therefore produced less biased
estimates
2. In addition, they assumed that their estimations, as well as
those, by Barro, may be subject to endogeneity.
In the case of transition economies, the inclusion of traditional growth
factors such as government expenditure and investment has been
questioned by some scholars. The estimations by Fidrmuc (2003)
showed that these variables had an insignificant effect on growth and,
in some cases, with the reverse signs. Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey
(2006) argue that the quality of data on capital investment is poor and
therefore unreliable. Instead, based on the other similar studies, the
authors proposed to include the explanatory variables capturing the
2 In their estimations adjusted R² was close to 0.28 against 0.5 in the typical cross-
country regressions. They explained this with the limited sample (1974-1989) and a
limited number of observations: 97 in the case of ICRG, and 47 for BERI.Azim Raimbaev  5
initial conditions and stabilisation policies. They calculated a
composite index for initial conditions which includes the initial level of
GDP, the distance relative to the EU, the initial allocation of labour,
the length of the former command economy period in the region, etc.
As to stabilisation policy, they had two options to choose from:
inflation and fiscal balance of the government. Since inflation took
extremely high values in the beginning of the transition, the authors
chose the second option. However, they admit that the data on fiscal
balance were also not reliable for the early periods of transition due to
improper accounting practices. Furthermore, they also employed the
reform index of the EBRD, but since not all reforms can be included
into the estimation (i.e. because of multicollinearity), they used the
composite EBRD index
3. The other methodological issue was that
some of those countries, which initially experienced severe output
declines had significant growth rates in the recovery period. For
example, the CIS countries, which typically faced long and deep
recessions, saw their growth rates to be close to 6-8 %. By contrast, in
the former command economies with relatively smooth starts the
medium term growth rates were also moderate. Furthermore, an
increase in oil prices helped growth in oil-rich countries such as Russia
and, in general, the authors found a strong correlation between oil
prices and growth in transition economies. Since all transition
countries have become integrated into the regional economy, these oil-
spillovers (e.g. in Russia) expanded to the whole CIS region. Similarly,
growth in Central and Eastern Europe was largely helped by the
economic development in the EU. Finally, based on the theoretical
assumptions above, Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) proposed the
following specification (with expected signs):
  ,  =  , +  +  + ,  ! +"#$%&,'  ( ) +   *+, -,./0
+ 123456,7 + 89:;<=>?,@ + ABCDEFGHI,J + KL MNOPQRS T,U
+ VW,X
where  Y , is the annual growth of real output of the country  at
time , 	
 is initial conditions index,  is the EBRD’s reform index,
 is general government balance relative to GDP,  is a dummy
3 They considered the possibility of assigning a proper weight to each reform in the
composite EBRD index. Indeed, some refroms are more difficult to implement.
However, they admitted that any weight assigned would be done in a subjective
manner. They proposed to use a simple averge of all reform measures of the EBRD.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 6
variable indicating if the country has reached its output level in 1989,
 is the share of oil exports in the GDP,  !"#  is growth of
exports.
Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) found that output recovery, oil
prices and external growth had a positive impact on growth. However,
the statistical significance of these variables for growth has not been
more than reforms. The authors also revealed that the impact of initial
conditions on growth diminishes over time.
Summarising the empirical findings in the literature on the institutions
and transition, Staehr (2005) has listed the followings:
(i) The initial growth rates were negative across all transition
countries, including those early reformers. There is little correlation
between the initial fall in output and reforms.
(ii) Classical production factors fail to explain growth in transition
countries.
(iii) The structure and economic well-being in the pre-transition period
determined the rate of initial growth. However, their influence
weakened over time.
(iv) Structural reforms, including monetary stabilisation, have a long
term positive impact on growth, but in the short run they may also
decrease it.
He also points to the unresolved issues in the literature on the link
between institutions and transition. Notably, it is not yet clear what
reforms have had the most significant contribution to growth, what set
of the complementarily is the most effective and what is the desired
speed of reforms. Staehr (2005) states that there have been a number
of articles attempting to figure out the most significant reform for
promoting growth (see Havrylyshyn and Rooden, 2000). He argues
that all these efforts did not yield conclusive outcomes, since there is
multicollinearity between individual reform variables, the quality of
data is poor, theoretical assumptions are poor and the growth process
is itself unstable. To address multicollinearity the aggregate indices of
reforms can be employed in the regressions. Otherwise, there is risk of
misspecification bias. On the other hand, there is a debate on whetherAzim Raimbaev 7
complementarity is more important than the individual reforms, given
that there is a lack of the reliable data and the issue of specification.
Given endogeneity between reforms and growth Staehr (2005) proposes
that growth can be explained by the initial conditions, the choice of
economic reforms and external shocks. His estimations were based on
the EBRD indices since he assumed that the major institutional
variables were strongly correlated with these indices. Staehr (2005)
applied the following specification:
 $%&' (,) = *+,, + -./0123  , 45 + 6789:;< ,  + =>?@AB,C
+ DEFGHIJKLMNO,P + QRSTUVW,X + YZ,[
where       , is the annual growth of real output of the country  at
time , 	
 is a time trend variable (1989-2001) that controls for
time in growth variables,  is a dummy, which equals 1 in the case
of war and civil unrest, and  is the EBRD reform index that is
the average of eight variables explaining reforms in the area of
liberalisation, competition, governance restructuring, large-scale
privatisation, small scale privatisation, price liberalisation, securities
market and foreign exchange system.
Staehr (2005) found that Growth and TREND were statistically
significant, which suggests that the latter had absorbed the influence of
the omitted variables (which was mainly due to the exclusion of
outliers). On the other hand, to offset heteroskedasticity, the author
employed the Weighted Least Square (WLS) model and checked
robustness of the estimations applying the alternative methods such as
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM). While similar results were obtained across all
methods, WLS seems to have outperformed the rest because it
demonstrated smaller standard errors.
Alternatively, De Macedo and Martins (2008) proposed the following
specification:
 , = , +  !"#$%,& +'()*+,-./012,3 +45678,9 +:;<=>,?
+ @ABCDE,F + GHBIJK,L + MN,O
where PQRST U,V is the annual growth of real output of the country W at
time X, YZ[\] ^ is the set of dummy variables taking a value of 1 for
each group according to the EBRD classification, _	 is theJournal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 8
inflation rate based on CPI, 
 is the reforms level (the average of the
EBRD’s transition scores, which range from +1 to +4) and  is the
reform complementarity index, which can be interpreted as the
measure of variety of reforms
4
Their sample included 28 transition countries over the period of 1984-
2004. The macroeconomic stabilisation policy outcomes were proxied
by the CPI growth (i.e. inflation). According to the authors, compared
to other alternative measures, the inflation rate is commonly accepted
as the best proxy for the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. As
De Macedo and Martins (2008) explain, the expected signs imply that
at the outset of transition, the increased pace of reforms positively
contributes to growth, but then reform complementarity will be
necessary to keep high growth rates. The authors applied the GMM
method to avoid endogeneity (or simultaneity) arising between growth,
level of reforms and the inflation rate.
It should be noted that the majority of research articles have been
focusing on reforms such as liberalisation, privatisation, etc. Almost all
authors employed the EBRD indices to represent the institutions,
while we propose to substitute the alternative measures of institutional
quality for the EBRD data. As we shall see, the institutional variables
and the EBRD data tend to be strongly correlated and therefore they
mutually cause the multicollinearity in our regressions. While the
EBRD indices represent the reforms in the areas such as finance,
telecommunications, infrastructure, they do not completely qualify to
be proxies for the institutional qualities. Since our aim is to find which
institutions have been most important for growth, we employ the data
on governance indicators (both aggregate and individual) as explained
in the next section.
2 METHODOLOGY
North (1989) claims that institutions are important for growth.
Moreover, he argues that institutions explain differences in economic
development to a greater extent than the traditional factors of






, where N is the number of reform areas (such as large scale
privatisation, financial sector reform, etc).Azim Raimbaev  9
transition literature, which show that classical production factors
cannot always explain growth. Other authors compared effects of
institutions and structural policies on growth. For example, Keefer and
Shirley (2000) argue that strong institutions in the presence of weak
macroeconomic policies cause greater growth compared to weak
institutions in the background of strong macroeconomic policies. We
contribute to this debate by examining whether institutions have a
greater impact on growth than factors of production and
macroeconomic policies in the case of transition economies.
Subsequently, we propose to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The importance of institutions for growth is higher than
other inputs.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) put forward the hypothesis that the
cross-country differences in growth seem to be caused by not only the
quality of institutions, but also by their heterogeneity. They give an
example of European colonies in the late fifteenth century. Europeans
initiated two categories of institutions in their colonies: first, property-
rights and other institutions conducive to the development of business
by European settlers; and second, institutions helping to develop
extractive industries. The first category was established in colonies in
the U.S., Canada, Australia and the second in Africa, Central America
and South Asia. The authors found that there was a strong correlation
between the category of institutions and income per capita.
Although heterogeneity of institutions matters for growth, it is not
clear which institutions are growth promoting. North (1990) singles out
property rights as a significant factor shaping growth. Knack and
Keefer (1997) tested the link between trust and growth across 29
market economies. They found trust and civic norms to have a
significant positive impact on economic development. However, the
statistical significance of certain types of institutions in growth
regression varies from sample to sample. We contribute to this debate
by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Certain types of institutions affect growth more than
others in transition economies.
The empirical test results will help us to answer our research question:
“what institutions have been most important for growth in transitionJournal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 10
economies?” Furthermore, we control for the EU membership
incentives, which have a strong impact on rapid institutional changes
in the EU accession countries.
Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) found that reforms had a
significant influence on growth after the break-up of the former Soviet
regime. Furthermore, the effect of the reforms lasted over subsequent
years and enhanced growth necessitated the implementation of further
reforms. The simultaneity bias caused by endogeneity between growth
and institutions in the sample of transition countries has been
acknowledged by other authors too (see Staehr, 2005; De Macedo and
Martins, 2008). We propose the following hypothesis to address this
issue:
Hypothesis 3: Growth affects institutions and therefore both growth
and institutions are endogenous.
As discussed in the methodology section below, we employ Hausman
and Granger causality tests for endogeneity. Subsequently, the 2SLS
model is employed to account for possible simultaneity bias. However,
due to the short transition period the effect of growth on institutions
may not be large.
2.1 DATA
In the transition literature it is often assumed that that the data
collection was imperfect in the early period of the transition process.
Indeed, the transition started unexpectedly because the collapse of the
socialist ruling itself was unanticipated by experts. As a result, the
public statistical agencies, like many other government bodies,
experienced rapid administrative transformations. Since the old
methodologies were inadequate and the new ones were not yet in place,
the data collection practices remained at a poor level. Therefore, many
researchers question the reliability of the data gathered at the
beginning of the transition process. For example, De Macedo and
Martins (2008) had to remove outlier points of the unusual (or
unexpected) high growth and inflation rates, which would cause biased
estimates of other variables. Such outliers are the observations for
Yugoslavia during 1992-1993, Georgia in 1994 and Turkmenistan in
1993. Obviously, these unexpected and extreme values in data reduce
the reliability of the research outcomes. Similarly, Staehr (2005) andAzim Raimbaev 11
Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) also had problems with the data
for the early periods of transition. The sample that we employ starts
from 1996 and, to our best knowledge, this year and beyond were not
mentioned in the literature as the years with the outlier points. On the
other hand, the world financial crisis of 2008-09 may be considered as a
structural change too. As we shall see, due to the cross-match between
different databases, our panel regression samples will include the data
up to 2007. Therefore, we effectively avoid this issue of structural
changes caused by the world financial crisis. As mentioned in the
literature review, we employ the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) published by the WB as variables explaining the quality of
institutions
 5 . The database was first published in 1996, then once
every two years until 2002 and on an annual basis starting in 2002. It
comprises the data collected from 31 sources provided by 25
organisations and covers over 200 countries. At present, the WGI is
the only comprehensive database on institutions drawing from all
available public and commercial governance data sources. For example,
the global poverty reduction projects such as the United States
Millennium Challenge Account employs the WGI indicators as the
eligibility criteria for the applicant countries (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi 2007). As Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) claim, the
WGI indicators have a competitive advantage over the other databases
on institutions because they cover the largest number of countries and
reduce biases involved in using the individual databases through
offering the aggregated estimates across all available sources.
Furthermore, they find that due to the specific weights assigned to the
source data, the WGI indices demonstrate 20 percent fewer marginal
errors compared to alternative aggregate data based on the unweighted
averages. However, the WGI has been criticised for joining the
different data sources under one category (e.g. corruption), which
might make it impossible to apply the WGI indices in the panel data
analysis (see, Arndt and Oman, 2006). For example, in the extreme
case, one country may appear in the judiciary corruption database and
not appear in the procurement corruption data series. Answering these
and some other critiques, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007)
5 This database is one of the most important outcomes of a research program that the
WB Institute and the Research Department of the WB launched in 1990 (IBRD 2007).
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay were initiators of this program and therefore the
governance database variables have become known as “KK” indicators. See
www.govindicators.org for more details.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 12
argue that the cases where a country is present in one source and
absent in the other are relatively few. Moreover, the WGI standardises
various databases and generalises them (e.g. considering corruption on
the very general level) so that the comparability is no longer an issue.
However, the authors admit that the above criticisms would be
relevant should the source databases be able to accurately distinguish
between the corruption types. Furthermore, it is unlikely that different
types of corruption will be uncorrelated. In practice, it is almost
impossible to meet any country with high levels of judiciary corruption
and, at the same time, with the low level of administrative corruption
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007:9).
The data from all 31 different sources are organised into one of the six
WGI categories:
1) Voice and accountability (VA) - transparency of the elections, free
media and free associations 2) Political stability and absence of
violence (PV) - absence of political coups and violence 3) Government
effectiveness (GE)- the quality of public and civil services, the quality
of policy initiatives and implementation effectiveness
4) Regulatory quality (RQ) - ability of the government to devise the
required policies and to implement them, its commitment to policies
and credibility
5) Rule of law (RL) – the extent to which residents follow the rules of
society, the contract enforcement quality, property rights, the
effectiveness of courts and police
6) Control of corruption (CC) – capture of the state for private
interests, the extent to which authority is exercised for private gain
and corruption.
The aggregation procedure for each of these categories is done through
assigning specific weights for the sources
6. Kaufmann, Kraay and
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where &' is the weight assigned to the (
th source, ) is the variance of
error term of the *
th source, + is the number of sources involved in
WGI index.
An individual source with the lower error variance receives a greater
weight in the WGI index because it has a more precise measure
compared to other underlying sources. Each WGI indicator takes value
from -2.5 to +2.5 and higher values reflect the improved institutional
performance. The authors admit that since there are no clear-cut
borderlines between the institutional categories above, the individual
WGI categories tend to be highly correlated. This implies that there is
a strong interrelation between the governance indicators. Moreover,
the annual updating of the WGI indicators also covers all previous
periods. This is done by the WB in order to maintain the
comparability of time series across years. Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2010) suggest that when comparing WGI across categories
and countries, it is useful to take into account the source data because
the WGI is a sum of the weighted averages and these weights may
change over time. The authors also claim that the true measure of
governance is unobservable and we can only estimate it through
imperfect proxies. In order to increase the precision and coverage, each
of WGI categories includes as many sources as possible. In turn, this
makes the database unbalanced, which means that, for example,
changes in the data may be caused by the newly-added individual
database.
We sorted the WGI database to create a sample consisting of 29
transition countries as defined by the EBRD. The sample includes all
available observations for the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-2009.
The missing data for some countries and discrete time series between
1996 and 2002 make our panel unbalanced. Nevertheless, these missing
points constitute a small fraction compared to the overall data and
therefore we do not have strong arguments to assume that they may
cause the problem of extreme heteroskedasticity. On the other hand,
following Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), we expect that the
WGI indices, which are weighted averages of the individual sources,
are strongly correlated. Indeed, as table 1 shows, the cross-correlations
between the WGI variables in our sample demonstrate a strong
multicollinearity pattern across all categories.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 14
Table 1: Cross correlations of WGI indicators
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
VA 1
PV 0.71 1
GE 0.89 0.75 1
RQ 0.92 0.67 0.91 1
RL 0.91 0.80 0.93 0.90 1
CC 0.89 0.77 0.92 0.85 0.94 1
Source: Based on Worldwide Governance Indicators database
These strong correlations may cause the multicollinearity in our
regressions, thus increasing the standard errors of the explanatory
variables. Although multicollinearity will not make our estimates
biased, it may change the significance of our control variables and lead
to Type II errors (i.e. we do not reject the false null hypothesis). Since
the different individual sources tend to overlap in their methodology
and data collection procedures and they have very similar definitions
for different governance indicators, their averages are also correlated.
In other words, because of grouping the various sources into one the
WGI category, our sample is unbalanced and there is high correlation
between these categories.
Following the suggestion of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010)
that the WGI should be complemented by the analysis of the
underlying source data, we examined the coverage of individual
sources
7. There are four individual sources which completely cover the
whole observation period (11 years). They are the Political Risk
Services (PRS), the Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire and
Democracy Index (EIU), the Institute for Management and
Development World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), the Global
Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO). To answer
our main research question, we employ all these sources in our
regression analysis. However, the main limitation of this method is
that some of the transition countries are present in one source and
absent in the other. For example, Georgia and Kyrgyz Republic are in
the EIU, but missing in the WCY. As a result, some of these
individual sources have shorter coverage than others. Nevertheless,
these sources enable us to choose the most appropriate one to test our
hypothesis. As discussed above, the institutional variables tend to be
7 Data are available on request (see also Raimbaev, 2011).Azim Raimbaev 15
highly correlated with each other. As a result, we run the cross-
correlation tests across WGI, PRS, EIU, WCY, and WMO in order to
reveal the database with the least correlated variables. The test results
suggested that the PRS demonstrates the least cross-correlation
compared to other sources, while the WMO shows the highest
correlations except for PV.
Another important data set for our research is the transition index
published by the EBRD. There are 14 categories in the transition
index. They all range from +1 to+ 4 with high scores implying better
performance (see EBRD, 2010). These categories are namely: large
scale privatisation, small-scale privatisation, enterprise restructuring,
price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system, competition
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities
markets and non-bank financial institutions, overall infrastructure
reform, telecommunications, railways, electric power, roads and water
and waste water. As the names imply, these indicators measure the
effectiveness of policies in the infrastructure, finance and
communications sectors. We employ the unweighted average of the
EBRD index since there is a strong correlation between its individual
components.
It was mentioned earlier in the methodology section that some authors
suggest employing the inflation rate as the measure of the success of
the macroeconomic stabilisation policies. The WB provides the GDP
deflator, CPI and annual inflation percentage rates based on these two
price levels. Among them, the data on GDP deflator is the most
complete variable covering all 29 transition countries over the period
from 1996 to 2009. CPI series have many missing points compared to
the data on inflation percentage rates based on CPI. This is explained
by the unwillingness of some countries to disclose the actual price
levels, while agreeing to publish the rates of inflation.
Following the literature review, we have sorted these WB data for the
application in our regression analysis: the school enrollment (primary
and secondary), gross fixed capital formation, general government final
consumption expenditure, and energy production from all sources
(equivalent of t of oil), energy use and foreign direct investment.
Additionally, we included an EU accession dummy for the new
member countries.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 16
2.2 SPECIFICATION
We start our empirical analysis by employing the fixed effect panel
regression analysis. The sample consists of 29 transition countries and
covers the period of 11 years (1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-2009). The
fixed effect model has two main advantages: first, it helps to increase
the number of observations given the limited database on transition
economies and second, it avoids the omitted variable bias associated
with data that do not change over time. The latter is expected to
substantially improve the regression results since the transition
economies are supposed to have region-specific fixed features. The fixed
model also helps to avoid the effects related to the initial conditions,
since most of the authors claim them to be time-invariant (See, De
Macedo and Martins, 2008). As a result, with the fixed effects panel
model there is no need to include dummy variables capturing the
regional and initial conditions. This is perfectly consistent with the
modeling outcomes from the previous chapter, which demonstrated
that there are time-invariant features of institutions. Therefore, the
fixed effects model allows us to specifically focus on the impact of the
dynamic or formal institutions on growth.
Following Staehr (2005), we specify our regression model to include
explanatory variables such as inflation and the average of the EBRD
transition indices. Structural economic changes due to the break-up of
the former Soviet regime caused persistent high levels of inflation rates
in post-command economies. Initially the consequences of inflation-
curbing policies were not dramatic given that there were few banks
and the financial sector was not yet fully functional. However, later the
creation of national financial markets increased the cost of anti-
inflationary measures. Cottarelli and Doy (1999) argue that the
transition countries have learned to live with inflation and reduce its
social costs by persistent indexation of salaries, stipends and pensions
to match the expected price increases. The EBRD transition indices
are also important part of our specification, because they measure the
scale of the post-soviet reforms in the areas of liberalisation,
governance restructuring, securities market and foreign exchange
system. These indices are traditionally employed in the literature as an
institutional explanatory variable.
We also follow Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), who proposed
including variables such as oil production, export growth and generalAzim Raimbaev 17
government balance relative to GDP. Economies of oil and gas rich
transition countries such as Azerbaijan and Russia are dependent on
world energy prices. For example, Azerbaijan had the growth rate
peaking at 33% in 2006, which was made possible by the opening of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in collabouration with Armenia
(EBRD, 2006). The opening of the pipeline was accompanied by high
world oil prices. Due to this extraordinary growth rate Azerbaijan was
the fastest growing economy in the world. To account for resource-rich
economies, we employed balance of energy production and
consumption per capita (t of oil equivalent) in our specification.
Exports are the main source of foreign currency income for all
transition economies and therefore export growth has been a priority
direction after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. As Falcetti,
Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) observe the inflation rate and government
expenditure are traditionally employed in the literature to account for
the success with the stabilisation policies. However, government
expenditure may collinear with the inflation variable because in
transition economies, where financial markets are still in their initial
stage of development, the issuing of extra liquidity is a common way of
covering the budget deficits. On the other hand, if inflation is cost-
push this assumption will be weak because this type of inflation may
co-exist with budget surpluses. Therefore, we include both inflation
(given by GDP deflator)
8 and general government balance.
Furthermore, we add an EU accession dummy to account for an
impact of the EU accession process. Furthermore, foreign direct
investment growth and fixed capital formation are also included in the
specification because growth depends on the attractiveness of business
environment for foreign capital and domestic investment
9. One of the
distinguishing features of transition economies is strong human capital.
Following Knack and Keefer (1995), we add the primary and
secondary school enrollment regressors to account for the effect of
human capital on growth:
8 As discussed earlier the available data provide us with three options: inflation given
by CPI, GDP deflator and logarithm of GDP deflator. We chose inflation based on
GDP deflator over the rest because it has a better coverage of the sample.
9 Initially, we planned to include foreign aid, but the data on aid turned out to be
incomplete. Moreover, we expect that the volume of the aid tends to drop dramatically
over time and, therefore, the aid variables were not included.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 18
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 !",# +
$%&'() +
*+,-./012345,6 + 789:;<=>?@ABC,D +EFGHIJKLMNOPQRS,T + UV,W (1)
where XYZ[\]^,_ is the annual percentage growth of real output of the
country  at time  in PPP terms (constant 2005 international $),
	
 is an average of EBRD transition indices,  is
a foreign direct investment growth (BoP, current US $.),  is a
balance of energy production and consumption per capita (t of oil
equivalent),  !" is a dummy taking value 1 for the new EU
member states, #$%&' is percentage growth of exports of goods and
services (constant 2000 US $), ()*+,-. is logarithm of fixed capital
formation (constant 2000 US $), /01234 is a general government final
consumption expenditure (constant 2000, US $), 5678 is a transition
period variable taking value 1 starting from 1996, 9:;<=>?@A is the
inflation rate based on GDP deflator (annual %), BCDEFGHIJ is a
school enrolment, primary (% gross), KLMNOPQRSTU is a school
enrolment, secondary (% gross).
To test hypothesis 1 we add the aggregated institutional variables
across all five sources (i.e. WGI, PRS, EIU, WCY and WMO) to
equation (1):
VW XYZ[,\ = ]^,_ +` , + 	
, + ,  +
!"# $%&' (,) +*+,-./01234,5 + 67 89:; ,  + <=>?@ABCDE,F +
GHIJKLMNO,P + QRSTUV + WXYZ[\,	 + 
, +
 !"#$%&,' + (),* (2)
where +,-./,0 is an average of institutional categories from the different
sources given by WGIAVER, PRSAVER , EIUAVER, WCYAVER
and WMOAVER for the country 1 at time 2.
We use the aggregated variables to avoid multicollinearity that the
individual institutional indicators (VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL, CC) might
have within each source. Subsequently, this allows us to test
hypothesis 1 across all sources. The explanation for the positive signs
in equation (2) is straightforward. However, government consumption
as a share of GDP can affect growth both positively and negatively.Azim Raimbaev 19
Therefore, there is no predetermined sign for it. If the government
focuses on value-added activities such as construction or investment in
education, then the positive sign should be expected. On the other
hand, more centralised expenditures may also imply diverting resources
to less productive areas. The theory would suggest that growth is
subject to business cycles and since transition countries are supposed
to be in the recovery phase, TIME is expected to have a negative sign.
Based on our observations, we may add that the high oil prices from
the recent past might have been significantly harmful to growth
prospects in transition economies. As a result, the increases in TIME
should be associated with the diminishing rates of growth.
INFLATION is expected to get the negative sign because the high
rates of inflation are associated with the failing macroeconomic
reforms.
We start our regression runs with the model which includes all
theoretically relevant regressors in order to avoid the possible omitted
variable bias. Although equation (2) has all of its variables based on
theoretical assumptions, we nevertheless expect some of them to be
irrelevant. After balancing out our regressions (i.e. removing irrelevant
regressors), we test hypothesis 2. For this reason, we replace the
averages of institutional indicators with individual variables:
3456789,: = ;<,= + >?(@A,BC,DE,FG,HI,JK)L,M,N + OPQRSTU VWX,Y +
Z[\]^_`, +  	
 , + ,  +   !," +
#$%&'()*+,,- + ./0123456,7 + 89:;<= + >?@ABCDEFGHIJ,K +
LMNOPQRSTUVWX,Y + Z[\]	 
, + , (3)
where (,,,, ,),, is VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL,CC
variables from WGI(k=1), PRS(k=2), EIU (k=3), WCY (k=4) and
WMO (k=5)
As discussed above, our regressors may be subject to endogeneity,
which is the feedback effect from growth to the institutional variables.
Some authors suggested that endogeneity is not an issue in the case of
transition economies because transition has gone over a very short
period for this effect to be apparent. However, De Macedo and Martins
(2008) claimed that there might be endogeneity between growth, the
inflation rate and level of reforms in the transition countries. We use
the Granger causality and Hausman tests to reveal any simultaneityJournal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 20
between growth and individual institutional variables
10. Then, if the
simultaneity is detected, Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method will
be used to run our regressions as a simultaneous equations system. In
addition, this change in specification tests our estimations for
robustness. Moreover, Staehr (2005) suggested that the growth model
should be of the dynamic form with the first order lagged dependent
variable as one of the regressors. However, we suppose that the
application of dynamic regression model to the small samples will
generate biased estimates. This bias is normally caused by the serial
correlation specific to the dynamic models and makes the Durbin-
Watson d test unreliable
11. While there are some alternative remedies
to cope with these issues, their effectiveness is not significant in the
small samples. Nevertheless, in the results section below we also
provided the outcomes for the dynamic version of equation (3). We
used the GMM method for dynamic panel estimates with the fixed
effect.
The advantage of the panel estimation with the fixed effect is that it
helps to control for the impact of country specific fixed features on
economic development. However, if there is need to evaluate the
magnitude of the heterogeneities, the random effect model is
appropriate (although it may be subject to the omitted variable bias).
We propose to run a Hausman test in order to see if the fixed and
random effect models for equation (3) are indeed significantly different.
If they are not, then we would be able to extract unbiased results from
the random effects model too and evaluate the coefficients of the
region-specific dummy variables.
3 RESULTS
In this section, we empirically test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Table 2
(a,b) below shows the regression estimates based on equation (2).
Following our methodology, first we try to identify the irrelevant
variables. Regressions 7 and 8 demonstrate a serial correlation pattern.
It should be noted that although we collected the maximum data
10 We use the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1989). This
version of the Hausman test is done with the help of auxiliary regressions.
11 The serial correlation in dynamic models is the usual case since the error term is
always correlated with the lagged dependant variable. Unlike in other OLS models,
this serial correlation also results in biased estimates.Azim Raimbaev 21
available for our variables and in the best case would expect the
degrees of freedom to reach 300 observations, the missing data in some
of variables caused the sample to diminish almost by half (i.e. to
around 150 observations). Since we are applying unbalanced data the
maximum possible sample is employed. The results presented in table 2 
(a,b) suggest that there are some irrelevant variables. Our decision
about the relevancy of a variable is based on the theoretical
assumptions, the cross-correlation table (i.e. for possible
multicollinearity), changes in adjusted R² and the Akaike and Schwarz
criterion.
The insignificant t- statistics from table 2 (a,b) below suggest that the
EBRDAVER, EUACESSS, and GOVBAL are irrelevant variables.
Indeed, regressions 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 11 demonstrate that the estimates
become slightly better once these variables are removed. We also find
EBRDAVER to be strongly correlated with all aggregate institutional
variables and EUACCESS
12. Similarly, GOVBAL is strongly correlated
with INFLATION, which may suggest that governments in transition
countries tend to cover their budget deficits primarily from inflationary
sources. As with regard to ENROLPRIM and ENROLSECOND, the
tests showed that these are relevant variables although they remain
steadily insignificant. Their exclusion caused the omitted variable bias,
which is opposite to Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), who claimed
that school enrollment can be omitted from growth regressions in the
case of the former planned economies. As discussed in the methodology
section above, the authors supposed its effect to be too weak at the
early stages of the transition. While we agree that ENROLPRIM and
ENROLSECOND have insignificant effect, we keep them in our
regressions based on the strong theoretical assumptions from the
classical growth literature and in order to reduce the possible omitted
variable bias.
To test hypothesis 1 we use even numbered regressions (columns) in
table 2 (a,b) because they do not include irrelevant variables discussed
above. The WGI data are measured on the scale from -2.5 to +2.5,
while the institutional variables from PRS, EIU, WCY and WMO
12 It can be argued that these variables are subject to a severe multicollinearity and
therefore, not necessarily irrelevant. On the other hand, as a remedy for
multicollinearity some of these variables might be removed. Based on these arguments,
we still tend to consider them as irrelevant variables.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 22
databases take values between 0 and 1. Therefore, we expect the
coefficients of WGI to be greater than that of the alternative sources.
EUACCESS is a dummy variable, FDIGR also ranges from 0 to 1,
ENERGY is measured in tons of energy equivalent of oil per capita,
EXPGR, INFLATION and school enrollment explanatory variables are
given in percentage terms.
We can draw a number of conclusions from the regression results
presented in table 2 (a,b). Except for WCYAVER, across all
regressions three variables demonstrated a significant impact on
growth: ENERGY, EXPGR and LFIXCAP. On the other hand, our
interest variables WGIAVER, PRSAVER, EIUAVER, WCYAVER
and WMOAVER were not as significant, except perhaps for
PRSAVER. However, these interest variables increased their
significance after the removal of the EBRDAVER, which pointes to
the presence of multicollinearity in the original regressions (i.e.
regressions 1, 3, etc).
Regression 11 which does not include the interest variables
demonstrated good statistical results. Its adjusted R ² is equal to 0.68
and there is no sign of econometric issues. On the other hand, the
explanatory power of this regression increases to 0.73 after we add
PRSAVER to the regression (i.e. adjusted R² increased from 0.68 in
the column 11 to 0.73 in column 4). However this is not the case with
other institutional variables. It follows that hypothesis 1 test results
depend on which institutional source is considered. We may accept this
hypothesis if we employ the aggregated PRS database, while reject it
in the case of the EIU. Both WGI and WMO’s aggregated measures
demonstrated the rejection of the null hypothesis of no institutional
impact on growth at 10% significance level. It can be argued based on
the theoretical assumptions that these regressions may be subject to
endogeneity (or simultaneity) bias and that there is a feedback effect
going from growth to institutional variables. As a result, there might
be a specification error too. To address this argument, we run the
Granger causality and Hausman tests across growth and aggregate
institutional variables
13. The Granger causality test results
demonstrate that there is no dual causality (therefore, endogeneity).
13 Estimations are available on request.Azim Raimbaev 23
Table 2a: OLS fixed effect panel regression results over the five sources
(WGI, PRS, EIU, WCY, WMO). Dependent variable: GROWTH
WGIAVER PRSAVER EIUAVER


























































































































































161 170 127 135 131 140
Adjusted R² 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.75
Durbin Watson
stat
1.92 1.87 1.84 1.79 1.99 1.93
Notes: *, ** and *** denote variables are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The Hausman test, based on lagged growth as an instrument, suggests
that there might be some endogeneity between growth and aggregate
institutional variables. Therefore, the existence of endogeneity is
ambiguous. Furthermore, as we shall see below, possible remedies for
endogeneity are not effective given the limited sample size.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 24
Table 2b: OLS fixed effect panel regression results over the five sources
(WGI, PRS, EIU, WCY, WMO). Dependent variable: GROWTH
WCYAVER WMOAVER





























































































































52 60 147 155 170
Adjusted R² 0.66 0.62 0.70 0.71 0.68
Durbin Watson stat 1.69 1.42 1.94 1.94 1.83
Notes: *, ** and *** denote variables are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The Durbin-Watson statistic shows that there is no serial correlation.
Moreover, we did not find any heteroskedasticity in our estimates.
Furthermore, since we are using the non-stationary growth variable
and our panel with fixed effects controls for the possible heterogeneities
in the cross-sections, we have strong arguments to assume that our t-Azim Raimbaev 25
statistics are not biased
14. To summarise, our regression results found
that the statistical significance of the link between growth and
institutions depends on the choice of the governance database. This
reflects the considerable discrepancies in the methodologies of the
organisations publishing governance indicators. Moreover, we find that
even though institutions appeared to be significant for growth, their
explanatory power was not more than that of other growth
determinants. Therefore, we reject hypothesis 1. This supports the
findings of Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000) who claim that while
institutions are important for growth in the transition countries, their
impact is not as strong as that of structural reforms (or classical
growth factors)
15.
We now turn to testing hypothesis 2. For this reason, we employ the
disaggregated institutional variables as in equation (3) and re-run the
previous regressions. The regression results are presented in table 3.
When considering the regression outcomes we should recall from the
methodology part that except for the PRS, all databases demonstrated
high levels of multicollinearity among their individual institutional
components. Regressions 12, 13, and 14 suggest GE to be the most
significant governance indicator for growth.
GE and RQ are categorised in the WGI methodology into a single
category representing “The capacity of the government to effectively
formulate and implement sound policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi 2010:4). The greater values of GE represent the improved
expectations about the quality of public and civil services, while RQ
implies the perception about the potential of the government to
implement the regulations aimed at promoting private sector
development. As a result, we conclude that institutional variables
differ in their significance for growth in the former command
economies.
14 Additionally, as the theory of econometrics suggests, heteroskedasticity, like
multicollinearity, does not cause biased estimates, but may increase their standard
errors.
15 As discussed in the literature review Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000) find
structural reforms such as privatisation of state assets and eliminating price distortions
to have a stronger impact on growth than institutions. Similarly, in our regressions,
growth of fixed capital formation and exports (which outperformed institutions) is
closely tied to such structural reforms.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 26























































































































































































































170 140 155 135 129 110
Adjusted R² 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.55
D W 1.86 1.93 2.05 1.88 2.34
Notes: a.*, ** and *** denote variables are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
b. WGI column should read: WGIVA, WGIPV, WGIGE, WGIRQ, WGIRL, WGICC;
EIU column: EIUVA, EIUPV, EIUGE, EIURQ, EIURL, EIUCC, etc.- six institutional
variables across four databases (WGI, EIU, WMO, PRS). c. Panel Two Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) method. Instrumental rank-33, instruments used for VA: C,
GROWTHt-1, PRSPV, PRSGE, PRSRQ, PRSRL, PRSCC, FDIGR, ENERGY,
EXPGR, LFIXCAP, TIME, INFLATION, ENROLPRIM, ENROLSECOND. White
period standard errors and covariance were applied to correct for possible biases in SE
caused by the serial correlation. The first stage F-statistics suggests that theseAzim Raimbaev 27
instruments are valid. d. J statistics -1.33, Instrumental rank- 19.0, Instrumental list-
second order lagged regressors.
Our empirical estimates suggest that we cannot reject hypothesis 2
since the effectiveness of the government in the implementation of
policies appears to be the most significant determinant of growth
compared to other governance indicators. This complements the
arguments discussed above, which claimed that the success of economic
development in the transition countries was positively linked to the
ability of the government to implement reforms (see, for example,
Cheung, 1998; Fidrmuc, 2003).
To test hypothesis 3 we employed only the PRS source, because unlike
the rest of governance databases, it is not subject to a severe
multicollinearity. Specifically, we test if there is a simultaneity bias in
our estimations, which might be caused by a dual casual link between
growth and the individual institutional categories. For this reason we
run a Granger causality test. The test results suggest that the dual
causality exists between the VA and growth. The Hausman test also
demonstrated the presence of endogeneity
16. Subsequently, we apply
the 2SLS model to evaluate our estimates in the system of
simultaneous equations:
  !",# = $%,& + '()*+,-.,/ + 01  2345,6 + 78 9:;<=>,? +
@A BCDEFG,H + IJKLMNOP,Q + RS TUVWXY,Z + [	
 ,  +
  , +, +  !"#$%&'(,) + *+,-./0 +
123 456789:;<,= + >?@ABCDEFGHIJ,K + LMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ,[ + \ , 
	
,, = , +   , +   !"#,$ + %&'()*+,,- +
./  0123,4 + 56789:;<,= + >? @ABCDE,F + GHIJK LMNOPQ,R +
STUVWXYZ [, +	 ,  +  
 , +  +
 !"#$%&',( + )*+,-./01234 ,  + 56789:;<=>?@A B,C + DE,F
where GHIJKLMNOPQR,S,T is a reduced form of endogenous variable (i.e.
first stage variable defined by the instruments).
16 However, the results of the Hausman test were different when we applied the
EBRDAVER as an instrument. Although, the tests suggested no endogeneity, we
found that the EBRDAVER was highly collinear with other variables. Therefore, the
Hausman test results in the case of EBRDAVER might be biased.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 28
The results of the 2SLS estimation are presented in table 3 (regression
16). Normally, it is expected that 2SLS has lower coefficients than the
OLS estimates of the same regression. However, the results
demonstrate the greater coefficients and more significant t-statistics for
the institutional variables in the case of 2SLS. On the other hand,
there is a serial correlation pattern suggested by the DW statistic. As a
remedy, we applied the White correction method to reduce the impact
of this serial correlation on the standard errors. In general, 2SLS has a
lower explanatory power than the OLS model in our example.
Moreover, the relatively small sample does not give us a strong ground
to assume that the estimates in the regression 16 are unbiased. As it is
known, 2SLS is especially sensitive to the sample size compared to
OLS. Nevertheless, the regression output demonstrates that, although
estimates might be biased, there is a link between the individual
institutions and growth. Furthermore, ENERGY and LFIXCAP, like
in the previous regressions, remained as significant determinants of
growth. As a result, hypothesis 3 can be accepted with the assumption
that in the larger samples endogeneity between growth and institutions
will be more evident.
Finally, we test to see if the OLS specifications should include the
lagged growth variables as suggested by some authors above. We apply
the GMM method for the dynamic panels. The results are presented in
table 3, column 17. Again, we employed the same instruments as in the
2SLS method. The regression output shows that there is almost no
significant variable in the GMM specification
17. As with the
endogeneity link between growth and institutions, the dynamic
features of growth seem to be too weak to appear in the empirical
analysis.
As we presented above, OLS seems to be the best specification
compared to other alternatives. Furthermore, in the methodology part
we proposed to test our panel regressions to see if they can also be run
with the random effect. The random effect model would allow us to
measure the heterogeneity that may exist across regions. The Hausman
test results suggested that our regressions (in tables 2 and 3) should be
measured with only the fixed effect model. This implies that our
chosen specification is indeed robust. Moreover, we also tested our
17 We came to a similar conclusion testing our OLS specification in the dynamic form.Azim Raimbaev 29
estimates for the robustness using the shorter samples and found that
both the GE and RQ estimates remained significant over the earlier
periods too. As a result, we conclude that the outcomes of our
empirical analysis are reliable measures to test our hypotheses.
4 CONCLUSION
Among the institutional variables that we tested government
effectiveness had the most significant impact on growth. We found
that the governance indicators from the PRS database was the least
subject to multicollinearity. The aggregate transition index of the
EBRD did not have a significant impact on growth. Endogeneity was
present, but because it was weak OLS performed better than 2SLS. We
did not find the evidence for the validity of the GMM specification
proposed by some authors. Therefore, OLS seems to be the best
specification for the empirical analysis of institutions in the transition
economies at present. On the other hand, our estimations
demonstrated that the significance of institutions for growth is far less
than that of the classical growth factors. This can be explained by the
fact that transition economies are still in the process of developing
market institutions. Unless these institutions have the potential to
influence the business environment, the transactions will be managed
by the so-called “informal institutions”
18. These are informal norms and
traditions which change very slowly over time. They were inherited
from the former Soviet Union and, perhaps, working in the background
as the natural break for the reform process. The quality of these
informal rules is not quantifiable and, as a result, regression analysis
cannot explicitly show their effect on growth. Furthermore, the
generalisation of our results might be limited due to the short sample
period, which is typical to the literature on transition. As the influence
of market institutions on growth will become comparable to that in the
developed economies in the long run, we will be in a better position to
obtain the estimates of a greater significance.
18 See North (1992) for a comprehensive introduction to the theory of informal
institutions.Journal of Economics and Econometrics Vol. 54, No. 2. 30
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APPENDIX
Table 4: Variables, their definitions and sources
Variables Definition Source
CC
Capture of the state for private interests, the extent





EBRDAVER Average of EBRD transition indices EBRD
ENERGY
Balance of energy production and consumption per
capita (t of oil equivalent),
The World Bank
database
ENROLPRIM School enrolment, primary (% gross)
The World Bank
database




Dummy taking value 1 for the new EU member
states
EXPGR
Percentage growth of exports of goods and services









The quality of public and civil services, the quality of





Annual percentage growth of real output in PPP




General government final consumption expenditure
(constant 2000, US $)
EBRD Transition
Report (2009)




The unweighted average of six institutional variables
published by the Worldwide Governance Indicators














The extent to, which residents follow the rules of
society, the contract enforcement quality, property





Ability of the government to devise the required






Transition period variable taking value 1 starting
from 1996
VA
Transparency of the elections, free media and free
associations
The Worldwide
Governance
Indicators